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OBSCENITY
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974)
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974)
Handing v. United States I and Jenkins v.
Georgia2 represent the Supreme Court's most
recent encounter with the problem of obscenity.
One year before the Court decided these cases,
the Justices reevaluated obscenity standards in
Miller v. California and its companion cases.3
This note will explore Handing and Jenkins
in the light of Miller, examining the decisions
to see if Miller has made the obscenity question
4
more manageable.
The Miller decision has been the subject of
considerable controversy. With this decision,
the Supreme Court majority had hoped substantially to withdraw itself from the task of
reviewing obscenity cases on a case-by-case
basis. The Court's purpose in Miller was to
1418 U.S. 87 (1974).
2 418 U.S. 418 (1974).
3 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973);
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115
(1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of
Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United
States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
4 Before Miller, the basic test for judging
whether or not a work was obscene or constitutionally protected speech came from Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Under Memoirs, in order for an allegedly obscene book to be
denied first amendment protection, it had to be
proven that the book passed these three tests:
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in
sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social
value.
Id. at 418.
These tests generated enormous problems in litigation, a fact recognized by both the majority and
minority sides in the new decisions. A majority of
the present court, consisting of the Nixon appointtees and Mr. Justice White, were able to agree on
a new test. That test is set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24.
For a discussion of the law of obscenity before
Miller, and how Miller changed that law, see
Note, Pornwgraphy, 64 J. CRIM. L. & C. 399
(1973).

"set out concrete guidelines to isolate 'hard
core' pornography from expression protected
by the first amendment ... [in order] to provide positive guidance to the federal and state
courts alike. .. ." 5
Miller lays out the following test to set constitutional limits on obscenity regulation:
[W]e now confine the permissible scope of
such regulation to works -which-depict or describe sexual conduct . . . specifically defined
by applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed. A state offense must also
be limited to works which, taken as a whole,
appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way, and which taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. 6
Handing and Jenkins demonstrate how the
Court has applied its Miller standards.
Petitioners in Handing prepared an illustrated version of the Presidential Report of
the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography for sale to the public. The illustrations
were graphic depictions of various sexual acts
described in the report. Petitioners also prepared an advertising brochure for the book, including a full page of pictures of individuals
engaged in various heterosexual and homosexual acts. 7 Both the book and the brochure were
5 413 U.S. at 29.
6Id. at 24.
7 The court of appeals gave this description of
the photographs in the brochure:
The folder opens to a full page splash of pictures portraying heterosexual and homosexual
intercourse, sodomy and a variety of deviate
sexual acts. Specifically, a group picture of
nine persons, one male engaged in masturbation, a female masturbating two males, two
couples engaged in intercourse in reverse fashion while one female participant engages in
fellatio of a male; a second group picture of
six persons, two males masturbating, two fellatrices practicing the act, each bearing a clear
depiction of ejaculated seminal fluid on their
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sent through the mails.
Petitioners were indicted on charges of mailing and conspiring to mail the obscene book
and advertisement in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461.8 They were convicted of the charge regarding the advertisement. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the counts of the
indictment dealing with the book itself. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction,9 as did the Supreme
Court.
The petitioners were convicted before the
Court decided Miller, but their appeal was in
progress when Miller was handed down. In
Hamling, the Court said:
The principal question presented by this case
is what rules of law shall govern obscenity
convictions that occurred prior to the date on
which this Court's decision in Miller v. Califfaces; two persons with the female engaged in
the act of fellatio and the male in female masturbation by hand; two separate pictures of
males engaged in cunnilinction; a film strip of
six frames depicting lesbian love scenes including a cunnilinguist in action and female
masturbation with another's hand and a vibrator, and two frames, one depicting a woman
mouthing the penis of a horse, and a second
poising the same for entrance into her vagina.
481 F.2d at 316-17.
8 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970) says in pertinent part:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent,
filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or
substance; and...
... [e]very written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice
of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom, or by
what means any of such mentioned matters,
articles, or things may be obtained or made,...
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and
shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered
from any post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the
mailing, carriage in the mails, or delivery of
anything declared by this section or by section
3001(e) of Title 39 to be nonmailable, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the
place at which it is directed to be delivered by
the person to whom it is addressed, or knowingly takes any such thing from the mails for
the purpose of circulating or disposing thereof,
or of aiding in the circulation or disposition
thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both,
for the first such offense, and shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both, for each such offense
thereafter....
9 481 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1973).
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fornia, supra, and its companion cases were
handed down, but which had not at that point
become final.' 0
The trial court in Hamling used the definition of obscenity found in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,"h the leading case in the area prior to
Miller. Under the Memoirs test, the accused
could not be convicted of obscenity unless the
material involved was "utterly without redeeming social value." 12 Miller represents a
more relaxed view of this standard, banning
work which, "taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or social value." '3
In Hamling, the Court noted as a general
principle that it will apply a change in the law
which occurs while the case is on direct
review.'14 The reinterpretation of the obscenity
standard in Miller must be applied to this case,
said the Court, if it would serve to benefit the
petitioners.' 5 The petitioners conceded that, because Miller presents a broader definition, no
benefit will inure to them by the application of
the standards dealing with social value.
However, petitioners charged that their conviction for violation of national standards denied them the benefit of Miller. In Miller, the
trial court used the standards of the State of
California. In Hamling, the trial court used
national standards. The petitioners claimed
that Miller requires the use of standards of a
smaller geographical area. The Court rejected
this contention, saying that the use of a statewide standard, though warranted by Miller, is
not required as a matter of constitutional
law.'0 No material prejudice to the petitioners
is found. Said the Court:
This Court has emphasized on-more than one
occasion that a principal concern in requiring
that a judgment be made on the basis of 'contemporary community standards' is to assure
that the material is judged neither on the
basis of each juror's personal opinion, or by
its effect on a particularly sensitive or insen'o418 U.S. at 98.
"I 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
12 Id. at 418.
'3 413 U.S. at 24.
14 See Bradley v. School Board of Richmond,
416 U.S. 696, 716-21 (1974); Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 627 (1965); United States v. Schooner Peggy,1 Cranch 103 (1801).
5418 U.S. at 102.
16 Id. at 104.

19741
sitive person or group. .
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. The District

Court's instruction in this case, including its
reference to the standards of the 'country as a
whole,' undoubtedly accomplished this pur17
pose.
Thus, while the Court prefers the use of
"community standards" rather than "national
standards," viewing the instruction as a whole,
they found no reversible error therein.
Petitioners also raise the argument that 18
U.S.C. § 1461 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not specifically refer to the conduct described in Miller. The Court struck
down this argument, noting that the statute has
been construed as "limited to the sort of 'patently offensive representations or description of
that specific hard core sexual conduct given as
examples in Miller v. California.'"'Is Miller did
not establish new criminal acts which before
the decision were not proscribed by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461. Rather, Miller added a "clarifying
gloss" to the statute.' 9
The indictment involved here charges the
petitioners only in the statutory language of
§ 1461. They claimed that the indictment gave
them inadequate notice of the charges against
them, alleging vagueness in the term "obscene." The Court held that "obscenity" is a
term of art, "sufficiently definite in legal meaning to give a defendant notice of the charge
against him." 20 Moreover, said the Court,
"We think the 'knowingly' language of 18
U.S.C. § 1461, and the instructions given by
the district court in this case satisfied the constitutional requirements of scienter." 21 Defendants' belief as to the obscenity or non-obscenity
of the material is irrelevant. It is sufficient that
the prosecution show that the defendant had
knowledge of the contents, nature and charac22
ter of the distributed material.
The Court found no error in the trial court's
17
8

Id. at 107.

' Id. at 113. The Court here is quoting from

United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm.
Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973).
19 418 U.S. 87 at 116.
20 Id. at 118.
21 Id. at 123.
22
See Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29
(1896). In Rosen, the Supreme Court held that a
forerunner of 18 U.S.C. § 1461. (1970) gives the
defendant adequate notice. Said the Court:
The inquiry under the statute is whether the
paper charged to have been obscene, lewd, and
lascivious was in fact of that character, and if

exclusion of allegedly comparable materials.
Petitioners had called four expert witnesses to
23
testify as to relevant community standards.
The district court disallowed the additional evidence, finding it merely cumulative, and of
"no probative value in comparison to the
amount of confusion and deluge of material
that could result therefrom." 24 The Supreme
Court upheld this finding, noting the considerable latitude of the district court in such rulings. The Court found irrelevant the fact that
the other materials may have been available on
newsstands, or had second-class mailing privileges, or had been judicially determined to be
non-obscene.
Petitioners alleged error in the district
court's jury instruction concerning the prurient appeal of the brochure and the report.
The trial judge told the jury "it could consider
whether some portions of those materials appealed to a prurient interest of a specifically
defined deviant group as well as whether they
appealed to the prurient interest of the average
person." 25 Petitioners complained that the jury
was allowed "to measure the brochure by its
appeal to the prurient interest not only of the
it was of that character and was deposited in
the mail by one who knew or had notice at
the time of its contents, the offence is complete, although the defendant himself did not
regard the paper as one that the statute forbade to be carried in the mails. Congress did
not intend that the question as to the character of the paper should depend upon the opinion or the belief of the person who, with
knowledge or notice of its contents, assumed
the responsibility of putting it in the mails of
the United States. The evils that Congress
sought to remedy would continue and increase
in volume if the belief of the accused as to
what was obscene, lewd, and lascivious was
recognized as the test for determining whether
the statute had been violated.
161 U.S. at 41-2.
23 One such witness was Miss Virginia Carlson,
a student at San Diego State University. She was
to testify as to local community standards. Says
the Court:
She had undertaken a 'Special Studies'
course with her journalism professor, Mr.
Haberstroh, who was also offered by petitioners as an expert witness at the trial. Miss
Carlson had circulated through the San Diego
area and asked various persons at random
whether they thought 'adults should be able
to buy and view this book and material.' 418 U.S. at 108, n.10.
24 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. at,125.
25 Id. at 128.
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average person but also of a clearly defined deviant group." 26 The Supreme Court found that
this is permissible:
Our decision in Mishkin v. New York, 383
U.S. 502 (1966), clearly indicates that in
measuring the prurient appeal of allegedly obscene materials, i.e., whether the 'dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex,' consideration may be given to the prurient appeal of
the material to clearly defined deviant sexual
27
groups.
Thus, the jury can consider the prurient appeal of the material both to the average person
and to a clearly defined deviant group.
Finally, the Court found no merit in petitioners' objections to the district court's
pandering instruction. The judge told the jury
that in applying the Memoirs test, if they
found the case to be close, they could "also
consider whether the materials had been pandered, by looking to its '[m]anner of distribution, circumstances of production, sale,... advertising . . . [and] editorial intent. . . . 28
The Supreme Court held that this was a
proper instruction. Said the Court:
The District Court's instruction was clearly
consistent with our decision in Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), which
held that evidence of pandering could be relevant in the determination of the obscenity of
the materials at issue, as long as the proper
29
constitutional definition is applied.
Mr. Justice Brennan voiced a strong dissent.
He noted that, although the government has
the power to regulate the distribution of sexually oriented materials, the first and fourteenth amendments deny the government
power wholly to suppress their distribution.
Said Mr. Justice Brennan:
Since amended 18 U.S.C. § 1461, as construed
by the Court, aims at total suppression of distribution by mail of sexually oriented materials, it is, in my view, unconstitutionally
overbroad and therefore vague on its face.30
26 Id.

27 Id.
28 Id.
29

at 130.

Id.

30 Id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Mr. Justice Brennan set out other reasons
for reversal. First, he argued that it is impermissible to apply a "local" standards construction to the federal obscenity statute. Under
such construction, "the guilt or innocence of
distributors of identical materials mailed from
the same locale can now turn on the chancy
course of transit or place of delivery of the
materials." 81 Further, he noted that legislative
history indicates that Congress intended a national standard.3 2 The "local" standards construction, said Mr. Justice Brennan, "necessarily renders the constitutionality of amended
§ 1461 facially suspect under the First Amendment." 33
Mr. Justice Brennan disagreed with the
Court's assessment of the national standards
jury instruction as harmless error. The national
standard lies at the heart of the instructions.
Said Mr. Justice Brennan:
[T]he trial judge made 'national' standards
the central criterion of the determination of
the obscenity of the brochure. He referred to
'national' standards in his instructions no less
than 18 times .... 34
Because Mr. Justice Brennan felt the Court's
construction demands an application of local
standards, and that the instructions about a national standard materially affected the deliberations of the jury, he charged that the petitioners
had been denied due process. The petitioners
were prepared to offer proof as to local standards, had they known that standard was to be
Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
at 143 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Mr.
Justice Brennan says here:
The legislative history of § 1461 gives not the
slightest indication that the application of local
standards was contemplated. Indeed, the remarks of an early sponsor of the provision indicate that application of a national standard
was intended:
'If there be a trial in this country or anywhere else of an obscene character-of that
character that a report of it would corrupt the
morals of the youth and the morals of the
country generally-then I do not think the
United States should provide the means to
circulate that kind of literature in whatever
paper or in whatever book it may be published.' 4 Cong. Rec. 696 (1876) (remarks of
Rep. Cannon) (emphasis added).
33 Id. at 145 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 145-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31

32Id.

1974]
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applied. 35 The trial court held such evidence
inadmissible.
The trial procedure violated petitioners'
right to due process in another way as well,
said Mr. Justice Brennan:
They were tried upon a charge of violating
'national' standards and their convictions are
affirmed as if they were tried for violating
'local' standards.... The least to which petitioners are entitled is vacation of their convic3
tions and a remand for a new trial.
In the second case, Jenkins v. Georgia, appellant showed the film "Carnal Knowledge" in
a movie theatre in Albany, Georgia. He was
convicted of the crime of distributing obscene
material. The Georgia statute involved here
employs a Memoirs test, defining obscene materials as being "utterly without redeeming social value." 37
The Court reaffirmed its position in Hamling that defendants convicted prior to the
Miller decisions, "but whose convictions were
on direct appeal at that time should receive
any benefit available to them from those
decisions." 38 They held that "Carnal Knowledge" is not obscene under the Miller formulation, and that the first and fourteenth amendments required reversal here.
The Court sought to clarify the scope of
"community standards." Miller, said the Court,
merely approved of statewide standards; it did
not mandate their use. The Court here approved the trial court's jury instructions as to
standards to be applied. The jury was instructed to apply "community standards" without specifying what "community." Juries can
rely on their own community standards in making an evaluation, "and the States have considerable latitude in framing statutes under this
element of the Miller decision." 39 Describing
state options, the Court said:
A State may choose to define an obscenity offense in terms of 'contemporary standards' as
defined in Miller without further specification,
as was done here, or it may choose to define
Id. at 150 (Brennan 3., dissenting).
Id. at 152 (Brennan, 3., dissenting).
GA. CoDE AN. § 26-2101 (b) (1972).
3
8Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S., 153, 155 (1974).
3
9 Id. at 157.
35

36
37

the standards in more precise geographic
terms, as was done by California in Miller.40
Thus, the geographical area involved in
defining "community standards" may vary from
municipal to national without causing the majority to object on constitutional grounds. Still,
the Court decided to reverse the conviction on
the ground that the film was not obscene under
the Miller standards. The Court said that nothing in the film was "patently offensive," a requirement under Miller. Miller gives examples
of such material: "representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated," and "representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory
functions, and lewd exhibition of the
genitals." 4" This is not an exclusive catalogue
of obscenity, said the Court, but there was
nothing in the film sufficiently similar to justify treating the film as patently offensive. Said
the Court:
[I]t would be a serious misreading of Miller
to conclude that juries have unbridled discretion in determining what is 'patently
offensive.'42
Once again, Mr. Justice Brennan filed a separate opinion, this time concurring with the
result.43 He reiterated his criticism of the Miller standards first expressed in his dissent to
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,4 a Miller
companion case. Mr. Justice Brennan said the
Miller standards fail to take the Court out of the
business of defining obscenity on a case-bycase basis. Mr. Justice Brennan quoted his
Paris dissent:
[S]ince the status of sexually oriented materials will necessarily remain in doubt until
final decision by this Court, the new approach
[Miller] will not diminish the chill on protected expression that derives from the uncertainty of the underlying standard. I am convinced that a definition of obscenity in terms
of physical conduct cannot provide sufficieft
clarity to afford fair notice, to avoid a chill
on protected expression, and to minimize the
institutional stress, so long as that definition is
40Id.
41 Id. at 160.
421d.

43 Id. at 162 (Brennan, J. concurring).
44 413 U.S. 49, 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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used to justify the outright suppression of any
material that is asserted to fall within its
terms. [Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
45
U.S. at 100-101].
Justice Brennan noted that the Court alone
could make a conclusive finding of the obscenity
vel non of the film. He again echoed his criticism voiced a year earlier in his Paris dissent,
saying that under the Miller test, material is not
conclusively obscene until five members of the
Court, "applying inevitably obscure standards,
have pronounced it so." 41
Quoting further from Paris, Mr. Justice
Brennan said:
Because of the attendant uncertainty of such a
process and its inevitable institutional stress
upon the judiciary, I continue to adhere to my
view that, 'at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth
45 Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 163 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
46 Id. at 164-65 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Amendments prohibit the State and Federal
Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis
of their allegedly 'obscene' contents.' Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 113
(Brennan, J., dissenting).47
Calling the Georgia obscenity statutes "constitutionally overbroad and therefore facially
invalid," 48 Mr. Justice Brennan concurred
with the Court's reversal of Jenkins' conviction.
It seems that, at least to some extent, Mr.
Justice Brennan's words in Paris have come
back to haunt the Court's majority. It is quite
possible that Jenkins will be only the first in a
continuing series of cases demanding of the
Court continued case-by-case determinations of
obscenity. Even if Jenkins represents an extreme case, not likely to be repeated, there is
still the possibility of a chilling effect on expression caused by the public's reactions to
Miller.
47

Id. at 165 (Brennan, J. concurring).

48 Id.

